ERICSSON_CREATIVE QUANDARY

4/24/2013 3:13 PM

Creative Quandary: The State of Copyrightability for Organic
Works of Art
Lily Ericsson*
INTRODUCTION ................................................................... 360
I. THE NATURE OF NATURE IN ART:
UNDERSTANDING ITS PURPOSE AND GOALS ...... 362
II. KELLEY V. CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT ......................... 364
A. An Artist’s Fight........................................................ 364
B. The Copyright Standard ........................................... 366
C. The Seventh Circuit’s Analysis and Holding ........... 368
D. Kelley’s Effect on Contemporary American Art
and Artists ............................................................... 370
III. QUESTIONING THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S
DECISION ..................................................................... 371
A. Original Work of the “Wrong Kind” of Authorship:
Untangling the Seventh Circuit’s Oxymoron ......... 371
1. Clarifying the Language ...................................... 371
2. The Mistake ......................................................... 375
B. Stretching the Language of Fixation........................ 378
1. Clarifying the Language ...................................... 378
2. Fixation of “Wildflower Works” ........................... 380
C. Problematic Results .................................................. 382
CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 383

359

ERICSSON_CREATIVE QUANDARY

360

4/24/2013 3:13 PM

Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law [Vol. 23.2

INTRODUCTION
Our society’s relationship with contemporary art is not
unlike our relationship with mirrors.1 What we see in
contemporary artworks—like what we see when we look in
the mirror—may be beautiful, ugly, surprising, or even
incomprehensible.
Some reflections, like artworks, are
generally liked or disliked, and some are a matter of personal
taste. While we give shape and form to the images we see in
the mirror, these images, in turn, shape us—although
perhaps on a deeper level.2
The essence of contemporary art as an art form is complex
and multifaceted.3 Some contemporary artworks are more
aesthetic-oriented, evoking the traditional era of paintings
made with paint and sculptures hewn from marble. Others’
works push the artistic envelope into the realm of
commentary, either on social issues or on art itself, using
unorthodox mediums in surprising ways.4 In this era of
artistic pluralism,5 art critics and philosophers alike hesitate
to answer the question “What is art?”;6 some even claim there
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. in Art History, Minor
in Philosophy, Hamilton College, 2010. The author would like to thank Professor Gaia
Bernstein, Professor Charles Sullivan, and the Seton Hall Sports and Entertainment
Journal members for their insights, expertise, and guidance. This note is dedicated to
the author’s father, Richard Ericsson, Esq.
1. See Arthur Danto, The Artworld, J. OF PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 61, No. 19, 571 (Oct.
15, 1964)(“Hamlet and Socrates, though in praise and deprecation respectively, spoke of
art as a mirror held up to nature.”); see also OSCAR WILDE, THE DECAY OF LYING,
reprinted in OSCAR WILDE: COLLECTED WORKS 1134, 1146 (Barnes & Noble Publishing,
ed., 2006) (“Life imitates art far more than Art imitates life.”).
2. See MARY ANNE STANISZEWSKI, BELIEVING IS SEEING: CREATING THE CULTURE
OF ART 289 (1995) (“The most important artists of our time are visionary in that they
continue to challenge us to see our world differently. They represent our culture in
enlightened and, at time, beautiful ways. Artists prepare the mind and the spirit for
new ideas—new ways of seeing.”).
3. “Contemporary” art is the broad temporal genre encompassing art created in
the late 20th and early 21st centuries, and the art to come in the future. Scholars have
used the label “contemporary” to describe the art of “the present moment” throughout
the past century, because an era and its art can only be defined retroactively. See Dan
Karlhom, Surveying Contemporary Art: Post-War, Postmodern, And Then What?, 32
ART HISTORY 712, 716-33 (Sept. 2009).
4. Peter Plagens, How Art Has Changed A Lot, 16 AMERICAN ART 1, 8-10 (Spring
2008).
5. Karlhom, supra note 3, at 713 (Noting that art historian Eleanor Heartney
describes this generation of art as an “era of apparently anarchic pluralism”).
6. Plagens, supra note 4.
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cannot be an answer.7
The result of art’s struggle with definition, however, is at
times a terribly difficult and strained reconciliation with the
clarity desired by United States laws and methods of legal
application, especially in the area of copyright law. Granting
an artwork intellectual property protection is crucial for the
artist to maintain both economic and cultural standing in
America’s
modern
society.
Nevertheless,
current
interpretations of copyright law as applied to contemporary
works of art may be dictating, and even restricting, the
artistic “progress” encouraged by our nation’s Constitution.8
Part I of this Note introduces a recent victim of such
interpretations: works of art created from organic or natural
media. While this growing field of art encompasses many
sub-genres,9 natural media artworks all share the common
use of the Earth in their creation. Part I will sketch a brief
history of this field and its relevant ancestry, in order to
explore and understand the aims of natural-media art and of
contemporary art in general.
The legal issues addressed in this Note arose in the
Seventh Circuit case of Kelley v. Chicago Park District,10
discussed in Part I.
After the park district destroyed
Wildflower Works, a living version of artist Chapman Kelley’s
floral paintings, Mr. Kelley was denied moral rights—
delineated by the Visual Artists Rights Act of 199011—to his
work because the court determined it did not pass the basic
standard of copyrightability due to its organic flora medium.12
The court held that a work using natural materials as a
medium cannot be authored or fixed for purposes of
7. See Arthur Danto, From Philosophy to Art Criticism, 16 AMERICAN ART 1, 14,
15˗ 17 (Spring 2002) (explaining that as far as modes of artistic production are
concerned, nothing is justifiably preferable to anything else (not ruling out distinctions
in quality with no objective direction for art to take.).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
9. Sub-categories of natural-media art include, but are not limited to: Earth Art,
Land Art, Environmental Art, Ecoart, and Bio-art. See AMY LIPTON AND TRICIA WATTS,
ECOLOGICAL AESTHETICS, ART IN ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN: THEORY AND PRACTICE,
Chapter: From Signs to Sculptural Places (2004).
10. Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011).
11. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012).
12. Works must pass a relatively low legal standard to gain copyrightability,
consisting of physical fixation and a modicum of creativity. Most works pass these two
tests with ease. See Part II, B for further explaination.
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copyright.13 This decision, recently denied certiorari by the
Supreme Court,14 is distressing because of the possibly
damaging legal effects on works which incorporate natural or
organic media, and on the artists who rely on the copyright
system for economic and social protection for their works.
Part II analyzes the Seventh Circuit’s holdings in light of
the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution, the 1976
Copyright Act, and governing case law. After considering the
Seventh Circuit’s rationale for its decision, this Note argues
that the court incorrectly decided Kelley v. Chicago Park
District, and suggests an alternative interpretation of the
governing statute(s) and identifies black-letter law and
precedential case law in support of this interpretation.
Furthermore, this Article presents the consequential issues
this court created by denying basic copyrightability to Mr.
Kelley’s work.
Part III concludes this Note with an analysis of the
broader implication of this decision as an example of the
problematic judicial activism which often arises in cases
concerning complex works of contemporary art. This Note
argues that it is important for the courts to put aside
subjective notions of taste, aesthetic preference, and artistic
judgment if these courts are to apply a proper and objective
analysis of a work’s copyrightability, and follow both
statutory and precedential case law. This Note argues that
straying from this path of taste neutrality impedes artistic
development and the cultural and social progress encouraged
by the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause, and by
application, leaves many artists without legal paths for relief
when their livelihoods are compromised.
I. THE NATURE OF NATURE IN ART: UNDERSTANDING
ITS PURPOSE AND GOALS
In the 1960s, the trajectory of the traditional
institutionalized art common to our Western civilization
drastically changed direction. Fueled partly by the notorious

13. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 292.
14. Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 380 (2011).
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“readymades” of Marcel Duchamp,15 and partly by the
nationwide social upheaval of that era,16 American artists
funneled their sense of rebellion and skepticism of the
traditional towards a transcending of art’s status quo.17 The
result was a post-modern explosion of artistic movements
founded in the conceptual, including: pop art, minimalism, op
art, conceptual art, earth art, land art, environmental art,
body art, and photo-realism, to name only a few. These
movements persisted into the 1970s and 1980s, when artists
continued to expand upon these concepts, often recycling and
remolding them to better fit the social climate of their own
decades.18 By the latter half of the 1990s, artists no longer
felt the need to rebel against art history, and many returned
to the aesthetic-based techniques of Modernism,19 or at least
began to include these methods in their conceptual works.20
In the past decade, after centuries of evolution through
art’s reflection upon itself, the artistic community has joined
the rest of the world in its shift towards globalization.21 The
art of today’s generation focuses on eroding traditional
conceptual and geographical boundaries by working in a
broad range of media, including new technologies,
incorporating more audience involvement and the

15. See Marcel Duchamp, Bicycle Wheel (1913) (bicycle wheel mounted upside
down on a stool); Fountain (1917) (urinal turned on its side atop pedestal). See also Nat
Rosenthal, Marcel Duchamp (1887-1968), Heibrunn Timeline of Art History,
Metropolitan Museum of Art (Sept. 17, 2011) www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/duch/
hd_duch.htm.
These “readymades” “challenged the boundaries and even the
foundations of art as a concept.” Steven Goldsmith, The Readymades of Marcel
Duchamp: The Ambiguities of an Aesthetic Revolution, 42 J. OF AESTHETICS AND ART
CRITICISM 197 (Winter 1983).
16. Rosenthal, supra note 15.
17. Id.
18. Karlhom, supra note 3 at 720˗ 21.
19. The artistic movement of Modernism is summarized by an attitude of “Art for
Art’s Sake,” asserting the artist’s privilege to combine whatever elements he pleases for
aesthetic effect alone. Artists effectively reversed all the methods devised since the
Renaissance for transmuting a flat surface into a pictorial space, and instead believed
“that brush strokes and color patches themselves, not what they stand for, are the
artist’s primary reality.” See H.W. JANSON & DORA JANE JANSON, HISTORY OF ART: A
SURVEY OF THE MAJOR VISUAL ARTS FROM THE DAWN OF HISTORY TO THE PRESENT DAY
492˗ 93 (18th ed., 1974).
20. Karlhom, supra note 3 at 726.
21. Id. at 729.
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presentation of bigger spectacles.22
These contemporary
artists “are connected to something greater than themselves
and art: the world, the human spirit, democracy, or the
universe.”23 In particular, our society’s fixation on the current
state of the relationship between humans and the
environment inspires many artists to attempt to draw the
fast-paced, industry-driven, technology-obsessed American
back to nature by utilizing organic materials in their works.
Today, our fascination with sustainability and “green living”
is reflected not just in the food we eat or the cars we drive, but
also in our art. This art ranges from the purely aesthetic to
message-laden metaphors, using the Earth’s bounty as a
medium for their expressions.24
II. KELLEY V. CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT
A. An Artist’s Fight
Chapman Kelley is a nationally recognized artist,
traditionally known for his representational paintings of
landscapes and flora—specifically, romantic flora and
woodland paintings set within ellipses.25 In the past sixty
years, the Texas native has received many prestigious awards
for his paintings and has participated in multiple major
exhibitions throughout the country.26
In 1984, Mr. Kelley decided to take his artwork beyond the
canvas and actualize his wildflower ellipses.27 He received
22. See STANISZEWSKI, supra note 2, at 255-301 (examples of this new generation
of artworks).
23. Id.
24. Examples of these works include: Vaughn Bell’s Personal Forest Floor
(Portable Mountain) (2003-08), small organic landscapes on wheels meant to be tended
to and walked around like pets, and Village Green (2008), suspended personal and
portable biospheres. Rachel Wolff, “Turning Over a New Leaf,” ARTnews (April 2009)
http://www.artnews.com/2009/04/01/turning-over-a-new-leaf/; see also T. Allen Comp’s
The Litmus Garden (2001), a collection of native trees and shrubs planted alongside a
six-pond color-changing water treatment system. T. Allan Comp, Litmus Garden,
GREEN MUSEUM, http://greenmuseum.org/content/artist_content/ct_id-14__artist_id15.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).
25. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 291, 293.
26. Chapman Kelley Biography, CHAPMANKELLEY.COM (Oct. 22, 2011),
http://chapmankelley.com/3/Asset.asp?AssetID=6098&AKey=JLBDK6W2.
27. Wildflowers as Art in a Chicago Park, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1985,
www.nytimes.com/1985/06/20/garden/wildflowers-as-art-in-a-chicago-park.html.
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permission from the Chicago Park District to install two oval
flower beds the size of football fields in Grant Park along the
Mr. Kelley installed—and personally
city’s lakefront.28
financed—between 48 and 60 species of wildflowers native to
the Chicago region with help from his own team of
volunteers.29 The flowers were selected solely by Mr. Kelley,
and planted so that they would blossom sequentially, with
colors changing throughout the season and increasing in
brightness towards the center of each ellipse.30 The work was
entitled Chicago Wildflower Work I (hereinafter Wildflower
Works).
In addition to the aesthetic design, this real-life “painting”
was also a test of “the economic and ecological impact of
introducing wildflowers into cities,” including possibilities of
erosion control, reductions in water consumption and mowing,
and gas, manpower, and pollution reduction.31 The work,
promoted as “living art,” was a great success with the public
and with state politicians.32
Wildflower Works was maintained by Mr. Kelley and his
volunteers until 2004, when park officials wished to
reconfigure Wildflower Works to accommodate new
construction in the park.33
When notified of the
reconfiguration, Mr. Kelley refused to approve the changes;
the park officials nevertheless moved forward with the
reconfiguration a week later. Wildflower Works was reduced
in size by half and the remaining wildflowers were moved into
smaller rectangular beds along with new plantings.34
Shortly afterward, Mr. Kelley sued the Chicago Park
District on the basis that the reconfiguration of Wildflower
Works violated his moral rights under the Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”).35 Mr. Kelley claimed that the
28. Id.
29. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 293.
30. Id. at 293.
31. Wildflowers as Art in a Chicago Park, supra note 27.
32. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 292; see also Wildflowers as Art in a Chicago Park, supra
note 27(the chief horticulturalist for the Chicago Park District quoted as stating that
“Wildflower Works” is “unique in scope and size, and for its contrast and color.”).
33. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 294.
34. Id.
35. Kelley, 635 F.3d.at 295. The Visual Arts Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A, stems
from the French Droit moral, which “arise[s] from the belief that an artist, in the
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reconfiguration was an intentional “distortion, mutilation, or
other modification” of his work, and was “prejudicial to his …
honor [and] reputation.”36
In 2008, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois held for the Park District, finding that,
even though Kelley’s work could fit the definition of a
painting or sculpture required for moral rights protection
under VARA, Wildflower Works lacked the basic copyright
requisites of original authorship and fixation. Thus, VARA
protection could not be applied because the work was
inherently uncopyrightable.37 Kelley subsequently appealed
this decision to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
which affirmed the district court’s holding in January 2011.38
B. The Copyright Standard
While the Seventh Circuit Court rejected the district
court’s holding that Wildflower Works could be considered a
work of visual art under VARA,39 the circuit court did agree
that the work did not meet the basic copyrightability
standards of original authorship and fixation required for
VARA qualification.40
Copyright protection is rooted in Article I, § 8, clause 8 of
the United States Constitution, which delegates to Congress

process of creation, injects some of his spirit into the art and that, consequently, the
artist’s personality, as well as the integrity of the work, should be protected and
preserved.” 2 RALPH E. LERNER AND JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW 1252, (3d ed. 2005).
VARA grants artists the right “to prevent any destruction, distortion, mutilation, or
other modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or
reputation, and which is the result of an intentional or negligent act or omission with
respect to that work.” 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3) (2012). However, this protection is
limited to the following works of visual art: “a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture,
existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer … or a still
photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
Furthermore, a work of visual art does not include “any work not subject to copyright
protection under this title.”
36. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 295.
37. Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., No. 04C07715, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75791 *17-18
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2008).
38. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 308.
39. Id. at 300 (holding that for a work to receive VARA protection, “it cannot just
be ‘pictorial’ or ‘sculptural’ in some aspect or effect, it must actually be a ‘painting’ or a
‘sculpture.’ Not metaphorically or by analogy, but really”) (emphasis in original).
40. Id. at 305-6.
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the power “to Promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”41 Known as the Intellectual Property Clause, it
provides an economic incentive for artists to create art by
awarding them the right to profit from their creation for a
specific amount of time, in return for their eventual
contribution to the public and towards the “progress” fostered
by the Constitution.42
The most recent codification of the Intellectual Property
Clause is the Copyright Act of 197643 (“the Act”), which limits
copyright protection to “original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium44 of expressionFalse”45 Furthermore,
when the work at issue is a compilation of preexisting
elements with a different end result (as seen in Wildflower
Works), the copyright in the work “extends only to the
material contributed by the author of such work False”46
41. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
42. LEONARD D. DUBOFF & CHRISTY O. KING, ART LAW (IN A NUTSHELL) 158 (3d
ed. 2000).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
44. The medium in which a work is executed does not affect its copyrightability, so
long as the work complies with the other requirements. See DuBoff & King, supra note
42 at 167.
45. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (“Subject matter of copyright: In general: (a)
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the
following categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying
words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and
choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures
and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.”)
(Emphasis added). Additionally, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) clarifies that copyright protection
does not extend to “any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery False” See also H.R. REP NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976) (explaining
the narrow language change from that used the Intellectual Property Clause to what is
used in the Copyright Act, stating: “In using the phrase “original works of authorship,”
rather than “all the writings of an author” . . ., the committee’s purpose is to avoid
exhausting the constitutional power of Congress to legislate in this field, and to
eliminate the uncertainties arising from the latter phrase.”).
46. 17 U.S.C.A § 103(b). “The copyright in a compilation or derivative work
extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished
from the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive
right in the preexisting material. The copyright in such work is independent of, and
does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any
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C. The Seventh Circuit’s Analysis and Holding
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit saw Mr.
Kelley’s work of art as nothing more than a living garden,
which, it claimed, inherently lacked the kind of authorship
and stable fixation explicitly required by the Intellectual
Property Clause to support copyright.47 Because works must
be the original product of a human author in order to be
copyrightable, the court held that Wildflower Works could not
be copyrighted because “gardens are planted and cultivated,
not authored.”48 While the court found Wildflower Works to
possess the requisite level of originality for copyright,49 the
court rejected the argument that Mr. Kelley’s design was an
act of authorship, asserting that “[t]o the extent that seeds or
seedlings can be considered a ‘medium of expression,’ they
originate in nature, and natural forces—not the intellect of
the gardener—determine their form, growth, and
appearance.”50
Furthermore, the court did not find the work to be “fixed,”
holding that “a garden is simply too changeable to satisfy the
primary purpose of fixation51 False It may endure from
season to season, but its nature is one of dynamic change.”52
The court was also troubled by its inability to determine what
the baseline for fixation and copyright infringement may be
for a variable work such as Wildflower Works, for without a
sufficiently permanent and stable copy of the designer’s
intellectual expression, the work is not as easily susceptible to
infringing copying and as such does not require copyright
protection.53
copyright protection in the preexisting material.”
47. Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 303 (7th Cir. 2011),
48. Id. at 304; see also Id. (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM II:
COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 503.03(a) (1984): “‘[A] work must be the product of
human authorship’ and not the forces of nature.”).
49. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 303.
50. Id. at 304.
51. “Fixation serves two basic roles: (1) easing problems of proof or creation and
infringement, and (2) providing the dividing line between state common law protection
and protection under the federal Copyright Act, since works that are not fixed are
ineligible for federal protection but may be protected under state law.” Id., quoting 2
WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT , § 3:22 (Year) .
52. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 304-05.
53. Id. at 305.
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The court did attempt to clarify its holding, maintaining
that it was “not suggesting that copyright attaches only to
works that are static or fully permanent (no medium of
expression lasts forever), or that artists who incorporate
natural or living elements in their work can never claim
copyright.”54 Following this analysis, the court would find
copyrightability in other variable works, such as Alexander
Calder’s wind-activated mobiles, and even works created
using natural materials, such as Jeff Koons’ oversized floral
topiary Puppy.55 Because the court found Wildflower Works to
be neither authored nor fixed in the sense required for basic
copyright under the Act, it determined that Wildflower Works
did not qualify for moral-rights protection under VARA.56 The
Seventh Circuit court remanded to the district court with
instructions to enter judgment for the Chicago Park District.57
Following this holding, on July 18, 2011, Mr. Kelley filed a
petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court, asking the Court to determine “[w]hether an original
work of art that incorporates living elements is ‘unauthored’
and thus not protected under the Copyright Act,” and
“[w]hether an original work of art that incorporates living
elements can be ‘fixed’ for the purposes of protection under
the Copyright Act.”58 While American artists and their
advocates urged the court, in amici briefs,59 to open[] the door
to protecting artists’ rights,” these efforts were unsuccessful.60
The petition was denied by the Supreme Court on October 3,
2011.61

54. Id.
55. Id. at 305-06.
56. Id. at 306.
57. Id. at 308.
58. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 132 S. Ct. 380
(2011) (No. 11-101).
59. Brief for Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 132 S. Ct. 380 (2011) (No. 11-101); Brief for The
Intellectual Property Law Assoc. of Chicago as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 132 S. Ct. 380 (2011) (No. 11-101), .
60. Peter Simek, Dallas Artist Chapman Kelley Takes Wildflower Case to Supreme
Court, DALLAS MAGAZINE (July 26, 2011, 8:50 AM), http://frontrow.dmagazine.com/
2011/07/dallas-artist-chapman-kelley-takes-wildflower-case-to-supreme-court/.
61. Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
380 (2011).
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D. Kelley’s Effect on Contemporary American Art and Artists
With the denial of Mr. Kelley’s petition for writ of
certiorari, the Seventh Circuit’s ruling on copyrightability for
works which incorporate natural materials stands as the
leading decision on the issue. The impact of this holding on
American visual artists is significant; following Kelley, works
of art employing natural media run a grave risk of being
deemed uncopyrightable.62 As a result, many artists may find
themselves unable to protect both their economic rights under
the Act and their moral rights under VARA, leaving their art
and their well-being as artists without legal protection.
Art enthusiasts argue that the court’s muddled analysis of
the authorship and fixation elements “has opened up a
Pandora’s box of copyright issues for a vast spectrum of
artwork incorporating natural elements;” and that the court’s
degradation of Mr. Kelley’s artistic and intellectual efforts to
the labor of a gardener “greatly undermine[s] the domains of
land art, bio-art and any other artwork involving the medium
of nature.”63 Since the court cites Wildflower Works’ vitality
as one reason for its uncopyrightability, the opinion leaves in
limbo artworks that use lifeless materials which originated in
nature, such as Damien Hirst’s famed tiger shark suspended
in a tank of formaldehyde, and those works which are part
nature, part man-made, such as the 7,000 oak tree and stone
column pairs Joseph Beuys placed throughout New York
City.64
The Seventh Circuit’s self-comforting rationale that “the
law must have some limits”65 is viewed as the “kiss of death to
conceptual art” and detrimental to artists’ rights.66 Art
advocates warn that the Seventh Circuit’s ruling not only
“‘create[s] an adverse precedent for US artists who use
organic material to make their art,’ impacting not just Kelley
62. Chin-Chin Yap, The Un-Edenic State of Copyright, ARTASIAPACIFIC (May/June
2011), http://artasiapacific.com/Magazine/73/TheUnEdenicStateOfCopyright.
63. Id.
64. Id. (discussing Damien Hirst’s The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind
of Someone Living (1991) and Joseph Beuys’ 7,000 Oaks (1982-87)).
65. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 304.
66. Sergio Muñoz Sarmiento, Court: Not All Conceptual Art May Be Copyrighted,
(Feb.
16,
2011),
http://clancco.com/wp/2011/02/vara_moralCLANCCO
rights_sculpture_originality/.
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but also ‘the broader US arts community and the rights of
painters and sculptors,’”67 but also “challenge[s] and harm[s]
the ability to advise and educate artists in the area of
copyright law, especially with regard to works of art
incorporating living materials and other innovative
materials.”68 Such an undesirable use of American copyright
law carries on the practice of judicial misunderstanding
towards the arts community in the United States.69
III. QUESTIONING THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION
The art community’s concern that the Seventh Circuit’s
decision will significantly hinder future artistic and
intellectual advancement if other courts follow in its footsteps
demands a detailed assessment of the court’s analysis.70
Below is an examination of what is required of a work to be
eligible for copyrightability, paralleled with the Seventh
Circuit’s own interpretation of the § 102(a) requirements.
Specifically, we must delve deeper into the two operative
holdings of the Seventh Circuit’s ruling: (1) that using
materials found in nature in one’s artwork is the “wrong kind”
of authorship for copyright protection, as these materials owe
their appearance to nature, not the author; and (2) that using
living materials in an artwork precludes fixation for purposes
of copyright despite the work’s otherwise tangible and
perceivable form.71
A. Original Work of the “Wrong Kind” of Authorship:
Untangling the Seventh Circuit’s Oxymoron
1. Clarifying the Language
In order to sustain the utilitarian give and take of
67. Martha Lufkin, Chicago court denies artist’s copyright appeal, THE ART
NEWSPAPER
(Apr.
21,
2011),
http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/
Chicago+court+denies+artist’s+copyright+appeal/23575.
68. See Brief for Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 132 S. Ct. 380 (2011) (No. 11-101).
69. Simek, supra note 60.
70. Advocacy, VOLUNTEER LAWYERS FOR THE ARTS, www.vlany.org/advocacy/
index.php (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
71. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 58, at 1.
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protection and progress embodied in the Intellectual Property
Clause, § 102(a) of the Act requires that a work must be an
“original work of authorship” in order to be awarded copyright
protection.72 The 1976 Act does not define the terms within
this requirement. Instead, Congress deferred to case law
under the previous 1909 Act for its desired interpretation of
the standard.73 While the 1909 Act did not expressly require
originality, the courts uniformly inferred the requirement
from the fact that only “authors” could claim copyright
protection for their works.74 The term “author” was defined as
“‘the beginner … or first mover of anything ... creator,
Today, the “author” is more specifically
originator.’”75
recognized as the intellect behind the matter—the person who
conceptualizes and directs the development of the work’s form
and content rather than the person who simply follows orders
to physically execute the work.76
These definitions suggest that the terms “authorship” and
“originality” are mutually exclusive—a work is not the
product of an author unless the work is original.77 It follows
that we must also determine the intended meaning of
“originality” for copyright purposes. While the term might
seem to imply the need for a new and unique work as a whole,
in application it only calls for independent creation by a
person as an expression of one’s imaginative spark or minimal
degree of creativity—not novelty.78 Therefore, “a work will
not be denied copyright protection simply because it is
substantially similar to a work previously produced by others,
and hence, is not novel.”79 The terms “original” and “author”
72. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
73. See 1-2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01
(2011) (hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT) (quoting H.R. REP NO. 94-1476, at 51: “The
phrase ‘original works or authorship,’ which is purposely left undefined, is intended to
incorporate without change the standard of originality established by the courts under
the present [1909] copyright statute.”)
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting Remick Music Corp. v. Interstate Hotel Co. of Neb., 58 F. Supp.
523, 531 (D. Neb. 1944)).
76. Jane C. Ginsberg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law,
52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063, 1072 (2003).
77. 1-2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01.
78. See infra note 84 for a compiled list of relevant sources for this definition.
79. 1-2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01 at [A] (explaining that “novelty” is a
requirement reserved for patent law, and should not be confused with copyright’s
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signify codependent, almost identical, requirements for
copyright: when a work is independently created—not copied
from other works—it is original, and an original work’s
creator must be an author.80
The Supreme Court took pains to highlight this inherent
interconnectedness in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony.81 In determining original authorship of a photograph,
the Court looked for the imprint of the author in the subject’s
pose, expression, costume, and accessories, and in the
photograph’s arrangement of light and shadow on both the
subject and the background.82 Because these visible elements
owed their origin to the author of the photograph, the court
This
found originality for copyright purposes.83
understanding of originality and authorship is not only
dictated by the Supreme Court,84 but is also accepted by
almost every federal circuit—including the Seventh85—and is
“originality” requirement).
80. Id. (“Originality in the copyright sense means only that the work owes its
origin to the author, i.e., is independently created.”).
81. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
82. Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright’s Response to the
Invention of Photography, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 385, 390 (2004).
83. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58 (indicating that writings as indicated in the
Intellectual Property Clause include all forms of visible expression of the author’s
ideas).
84. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 214 (1954) (original pieces of art are tangible
expressions of an artist’s ideas); Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
348 (1991) (requiring only a minimal degree of creativity in original works).
85. See Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean-Chea, 11 F.3d 1106, 1112 (1st Cir.
1993) (describing “original elements” as those that were “contributed by the author”);
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1921) (“‘Original’
in reference to a copyrighted work means that the particular work ‘owes its origin’ to
the ‘author.’”); Kay Berry, Inc. v. Taylor Gifts, Inc., 421 F.3d 199, 207 (3d Cir. 2005)
(finding that the addition of the artist’s own imaginative spark is enough to denote
originality, and therefore copyrightability.); Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co.,
329 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that this definition is appropriate because
“any more demanding requirement would be burdensome to enforce and would involve
judges in making aesthetic judgments, which few judges are competent to make.”); Toro
Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986) (“Originality denotes only
enough definite expression so that one may distinguish authorship.”); Satava v. Lowry,
323 F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 2003); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d
823, 837 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Originality in the field of copyright requires that the work be
independently created by the author and that it poses a minimal degree of creativity.”);
Warren Publ’g, Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp., 115 F.3d 1509, 1523 (11th Cir. 1997)
(“What does originality mean? The selection must be made independently by the
compiler not copied, and must owe its origin to the author.”).
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thus, without question, dispositive on both the Seventh
Circuit and our investigation here.
For compilation works, such as Wildflower Works,
copyright protection requires an additional step: an analysis
of the work’s specific identifiable components to determine the
scope of the work’s protection. While a work as a whole may
be original enough to receive copyright protection, specific
components within the work may not qualify as “original” and
“authored,” and therefore the artist cannot receive piecemeal
copyright protection for those components.86 Interpretation of
this requirement for copyright universally follows the
Supreme Court’s holding in the seminal case of Feist
Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co,87 which held
that even if facts are not copyrightable because they do not
owe their origin to an act of authorship,88 compilations of facts
may receive copyright protection if the compilation is
sufficiently original.89
Once again, while the originality factor is the sine qua non
of copyright, the requisite level of originality in a compilation
is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.90 As long
as the choices of selection and arrangement “are made
independently by the compiler and entail a minimal degree of
86. See Bucklew, 329 F.3d at 929 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating “[e]very expressive work
can be decomposed into elements not themselves copyrightable False The presence of
such elements obviously does not forfeit copyright protection of the work as a whole . . .;
it is the combination of elements, or particular novel twists given to them, that supply
the minimal originality required for copyright protection.” Note that this decision is
dispositive precedent for Kelley).
87. Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). In this case, the
court held that alphabetical listings of names, accompanied by towns and phone
numbers, in a telephone book’s white pages were not copyrightable because the listings
were uncopyrightable facts, and the telephone company did not select, coordinate, or
arrange these uncopyrightable facts in an original way sufficient to satisfy the
minimum standards for copyright protection.
88. “The most fundamental axiom of copyright law is that ‘no author may copyright
his ideas or the facts he narrates.’” Id. at 344-45 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)).
89. Id. at 344. The Court followed the definition of “compilation” as found in § 101
of the Copyright Act: “a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting
materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the
resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.” Id. at 356
(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (emphasis in original)); see also 17 U.S.C. § 103(b)
(1988) (“copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material
contributed by the author of such work”).
90. Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 345.
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creativity, [the compilation is] sufficiently original that
Congress may protect such compilations through the
copyright laws.”91 Again, such copyright protection is limited
only to the elements of the work that are original to the
author.92
Like compilation works containing facts, those works
which utilize elements found in nature, such as Wildflower
Works, must also undergo analytical scrutiny to separate the
authored elements from the uncopyrightable in order to
determine the scope of copyright protection. The United
States Copyright Office dictates that a work “must owe its
origin to a human being. Materials produced solely by
nature, by plants, or by animals are not copyrightable.”93
Examples of such uncopyrightable works include those
produced by mechanical process or random selection without
any contribution by a human author, such as a multi-colored
pebble design on a linoleum floor, and those owing their forms
exclusively to the forces of nature, such as a polished and
mounted piece of driftwood.94
2. The Mistake
In determining that Wildflower Works was created by the
“wrong kind” of author, the Seventh Circuit strayed from both
the Supreme Court’s binding precedent in Feist and the
accepted interpretation of this requirement in the Copyright
Act, and contradicted rulings on compilation works by
multiple circuits, including the Seventh itself.95 While the
court was given the difficult task of understanding and
deconstructing a nonconventional conceptual work of art, this
difficulty does not justify its erroneous analysis of the law.
91. Id. at 348. The Court later clarified “that the selection and arrangement of
facts cannot be so mechanical or routine as to require no creativity whatsoever.” Id. at
362.
92. Id. at 348 (1991); see also 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (“copyright in a compilation or
derivative work extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as
distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply
any exclusive right in the preexisting material”).
93. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM II: COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES §
202.02(b) (1984).
94. 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3.19, n.1 (2011) (hereinafter
“PATRY ON COPYRIGHT”).
95. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 58, at 1.
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The following paragraphs explain why the Seventh Circuit’s
application of the original authorship requirement is flawed
and how this application threatens the scope of copyright as
envisioned by the Constitution.
First, it is clear that Wildflower Works is both original and
authored as defined by the statutory interpretation and
legislative history of § 102(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act.96 In
Kelley, the Seventh Circuit conceded the inherent
interconnectedness of the statute’s relevant terms,97 yet failed
to apply this theory in its analysis.
The court first
appropriately rebuked the district court’s holding that the
work was not original because it was not novel.98 It was plain
to the Seventh Circuit that Wildflower Works was not copied
and possessed more than a little creative spark,99 although
the court did not elaborate on how it came to this conclusion.
The facts of the case show that Wildflower Works was
independently created by its author, using more than a
minimal degree of creativity.100 As a work which clearly
utilizes uncopyrightable materials to create the work as a
whole, we must look to the rules for compilation works
outlined in Feist and § 103 of the Act and separate the
uncopyrightable elements created by nature from the rest of
the work.101 While the individual wildflowers themselves are
not original to Mr. Kelley, the selection, coordination, and
arrangement of the flowers are completely original to him.102
Mr. Kelley was the sole mind behind the concept and
development of the artwork.103 Furthermore, witnesses of the
artwork state that it was “unique in scope and size, and for its
contrast and color.”104
This is more than enough to
96. See Yap, supra note 62.
97. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 303 (quoting 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:20: “[w]ritings are
what authors create, but for one to be an author, the writing has to be original”).
98. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 302-03 (stating that the district court’s analysis
“mistakenly equates originality with novelty; the law is clear that a work can be
original even if it is not novel”).
99. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 303.
100. And thus fulfilling the elements required for “originality.”
101. Feist, 499 U.S. at 348; 17 U.S.C. § 103(b).
102. This is analogous to the photograph in Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 55: the
photographer’s copyright lay in the selection, coordination, and arrangement of the
elements within the photograph.
103. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 291-93.
104. See supra note 33.
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substantiate a finding of originality in Wildflower Works for
the purposes of copyright.
After discussing originality, however, the Seventh Circuit
took a questionable turn in holding that, despite its
originality, Wildflower Works lacks the requisite “authorship”
needed to establish basic copyrightability.105 As a work which
utilizes uncopyrightable materials, protection will depend on
the authorship of the selection, coordination, and
arrangement of the materials.106 If the artist’s variations of
these elements are original, they may earn copyright
protection.107 Following Supreme Court precedent,108 these
elements were original to Mr. Kelley, and as such were per se
“authored” by Mr. Kelley, and thus Wildflower Works is an
“original work of authorship.”
Yet, in its analysis of the work’s “authorship,” the Seventh
Circuit ignored both precedent to determine original
authorship as well as its own reasons for finding originality in
Wildflower Works in the first place. The court did recognize
that Mr. Kelley specifically chose each wildflower according to
his concept and deliberately arranged and planted them in a
unique sculptural format.109 However, in its analysis of
“authorship,” the court mistakenly focused on the natural
materials used in the work and the overall creation’s basic
resemblance to a flower garden: “[s]imply put, gardens are
planted and cultivated, not authored.”110 According to the
court, Wildflower Works is just a garden, nothing more.111
The court’s decision turns on the authorship of the work’s
primary medium. The floral components of this compilation
inarguably owe their individual form and appearance to
natural forces;112 however, the selection, coordination, and
arrangement of the flowers were not results of nature, and
may be considered the product of an author if they are
105. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 303-04.
106. 1-3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.04(b)(2); See also Feist, 499 U.S. at 351.
107. Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 2003).
108. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
109. Brief for Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 6, n. 3, Kelley, 132 S. Ct. 380 (2011) (No. 11-101) (citing Kelley, 635 F.3d at
293).
110. Id. at 304.
111. Id. at 306.
112. Id. at 304.
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original.113 The court disregarded this second step, dictated
by the Supreme Court in Feist, and, in confusing the concepts
of artistic materials with artistic works, stopped short of
considering the elements beyond the individual flowers which
make Wildflower Works an original work.
The Seventh Circuit’s holding on authorship as dictated by
the author of the medium is also clearly inconsistent with
already-copyrighted works that use materials found in
nature.114 For example, the Copyright Office has granted
numerous copyright registrations to the floral and fruit
sculptures created by the well-known food retailer Edible
Arrangements, and also to the American Sand Art
Corporation for its sand sculptures.115 Even though the
mediums of fruit and sand are authored solely by nature, the
authorship requirement for copyright is not concerned with
the medium of the work, and so these original sculptures
authored by humans can be granted copyright protection.
B. Stretching the Language of Fixation
1. Clarifying the Language
The second requirement for basic copyright, fixation of the
work, is Congress’s method of ensuring that in exchange for
copyright protection, the work can be later made available for
others to copy in the public domain.116 A “fixed” work is
crucial to the “deal” between society and the author of a work;
without fixation, the author deposits nothing into the public
domain.117 It also guarantees that only the expression of the
idea is protected, rather than the idea itself, and thus
113. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 351.
114. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 58, at 20-21.
115. Id. (referring to Edible Arrangements’ “Berry Bouquet,” Reg. No.
VA0001021475; “Blooming daisies,” Reg. No. VA0001021473; “Delicious celebration,”
Reg. No. VA0001021474; “Delicious fruit design,” Reg. No. VA0001021472; and “Hearts
and berries,” Reg. No. VA0001021476, and to American Sand Art Corporation’s “Large
flamingo,” Reg. No. VA0000603490; “Macaw parrot,” Reg. No. VA0000603407; and
“Extra large castle,” Reg. No. VA0000603493).
116. Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1151, 1195-96 (2007).
117. Joseph C. Merschman, Anchoring Copyright Laws in the Copyright Clause:
Halting the Commerce Clause End Run Around Limits on Congress’s Copyright Power,
34 CONN. L. REV. 661, 681 (2002).
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preserves the idea/expression dichotomy of the copyright
system.118
This necessary separation of ideas from
expressions owes its origin to the “Writings” created by
“Authors” as stated in the Intellectual Property Clause.119 As
codified, § 102(a) of the Copyright Act dictates that a work be
fixed in a “tangible medium of expression.” The fixation is
sufficient if the work “can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device.”120
The accompanying House Report explains that the reason
for the sufficiency standard is “to avoid the artificial and
largely unjustifiable distinctions ... under which statutory
copyrightability in certain cases has been made to depend
upon the form or medium in which the work is fixed.”121
These “certain cases” referred to by Congress are those live
audible transmissions—such as music performances, sports
broadcasts, and news coverage—that reach the public in
unfixed form but can be simultaneously recorded.122 The
relevant case law also supports a broad interpretation of what
may qualify as a “fixed” work. In Goldstein v. California, the
Supreme Court held that “writings … may be interpreted to
include any physical rendering of the fruits of creative
intellectual or aesthetic labor.”123 Overall, both Congress and
the courts highlight the broad interpretation of fixation,
allowing, for the most part, a “material object” enough of a
vehicle for the fixation requirement.124
The fixation requirement withholds from copyrightability
those works that are not “sufficiently permanent or stable to
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a
period of more than transitory duration.”125 Examples of
these include “those [works] projected briefly on a screen,
118. Id. at 683 (referring to § 102(b) of the Copyright Act).
119. U.S. CONST. amend. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
120. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
121. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 52.
122. Id.
123. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973). See also Burrow-Giles, 111
U.S. at 58, stating that “Writings” includes all ways “by which the ideas of the mind of
the author are given visible expression.”
124. London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 171 n. 23 (D. Mass.
2008) (discussing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 52).
125. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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shown electronically on a television or other cathode ray tube,
or captured momentarily in the ‘memory’ of a computer.”126
2. Fixation of “Wildflower Works”
The Seventh Circuit held that Wildflower Works was not
“fixed” for copyright purposes because of the work’s
“changeable” nature, that “its appearance is too inherently
variable to supply a baseline for determining questions of
The court’s
copyright creation and infringement.”127
assessment, however, does not follow the test for fixation
presented in plain language in § 102(a).128 In fact, the court’s
reasoning behind its decision is unmistakably at odds with
both Congress’s statutory interpretation in the accompanying
House Report, and with the relevant case law on this issue.
For Wildflower Works to be recognized as “fixed,” it must
be (1) a tangible medium of expression, and (2) must be
permanent or stable enough to be perceived by an audience
for longer than a transitory duration.129 The Seventh Circuit
conceded that Wildflower Works is both tangible and can be
perceived for more than a transitory duration, and so the
question of whether Wildflower Works meets the element of
“fixation” should have ended there.130 Instead, the court
continued to reason that the work’s essence of dynamic and
perpetual change dictates that it is not stable or permanent
enough to be called “fixed.”131 This last inquiry is neither
required by the Copyright Act nor relevant to determine
“fixation” for copyright purposes. The court’s argument that
the essence of change embodied in Wildflower Works as a
garden precludes copyrightability is on its face insignificant.
Establishing “fixation” is not a matter of a work’s essence, but
rather of its ability to express the author’s idea for more than
a transitory duration. In addition, the court’s argument is
focused on the medium of the work rather than the overall
expression of the work.132 As it did with “authorship,” the
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 53.
Kelley, 635 F.3d at 304-305.
See supra note 46, for the test delineated in § 102(a) of the Copyright Act.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 58, at 22.
Kelley, 635 F.3d at 305.
See supra note 45.
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court once again ignored the analytical path mandated by the
Copyright Act, and instead devised a new test for basic
copyrightability.133
The majority opinion in Kelley is also internally
inconsistent in its analysis of fixation. While the court held
firm to its impression that a medium subject to change within
a work defeats the work’s potential copyrightability, it later
states that it is “not suggesting that copyright attaches only
to works that are static or fully permanent (no medium of
expression lasts forever), or that artists who incorporate
natural or living elements in their work can never claim
copyright.”134 Despite its attempt to redeem itself from its
disconcerting holding, the Seventh Circuit’s failure to provide
examples of what it was “suggesting” brings us one step
forward and two steps back.
The Seventh Circuit’s holding on “fixation” is especially
counter-intuitive when we consider the copyrightability of the
examples discussed in the opinion in juxtaposition to the
court’s standard. One example discussed by the court is an
artwork entitled Puppy by the popular contemporary
American artist Jeff Koons.135
This work, exhibited
worldwide, is a model of a puppy almost three stories high –
and made using a metal frame, soil, geotextile fabric, an
internal irrigation system, and live flowering plants.136 In
fact, at each exhibition the blooms on Puppy are noticeably
different in color, pattern, and growth. While this work
includes the same kinds of organic materials as Wildflower
Works and the same changeable nature, the Seventh Circuit
posited—without any explanation—that Puppy is likely to be
considered “fixed” and thus copyrightable.137 This is a glaring
contradiction, as in its opinion the court had just previously
declared that, because the “essence” of living flowers is to
change, works using them as a medium are ineligible for
protection.138

133. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 58, at 22.
134. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 305.
135. Kelley 635 F.3d at 305-06.
136. Jeff Koons, jeffkoons.com/site/index/html (follow “Puppy” hyperlink).
137. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 306.
138. Brief for Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 11, Kelley, 132 S. Ct. 380 (2011) (No. 11-101).
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Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit’s standard for fixation
cannot be reconciled with types of works which are granted
copyright protection directly by the language of the statue.
Choreography,139 though fixed only in the fleeting movements
of a dancer, is copyrightable so long as there is a written
explanation of the steps, or a taped recording; it can be
protected even from infringers looking to copy the
choreography from a live stage performance instead of from
the written description of the steps.140 Certainly this does not
comply with the Seventh Circuit’s denial of copyright
protection for works with an “essence” of “vitality,” yet it is
enough for the guidelines set by the Copyright Act.141
C. Problematic Results
The Seventh Circuit’s dual holding on authorship and
fixation presents two problems. First, the standard creates a
bar against granting copyright protection to any work made of
a natural or living medium – a drastic blow to the art
community. Such a disservice to innovative contemporary
artists will significantly hinder development in groundbreaking fields such as bio-art and eco-art, as well as in more
traditional art forms that use natural materials.142 Without
the possibility of copyright protection, artists who work in
these fields will be less likely to take artistic risks, thus
potentially stunting our society’s cultural growth.
Second, the resulting inconsistencies between this court’s
holding and the statutory language and case law threaten the
uniform enforcement of copyright protection in the United
States. The court’s holding on “authorship” indicates that
there are “right” and “wrong” kinds of authorship for
copyright purposes, and that the human creator of an original
work might not always be an author after all. Additionally,
the court’s problematic fixation standard and its reluctance to
exemplify the scope of this standard add nothing but
139. As an enumerated subject of copyright 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a)(4), see supra note
46.
140. Brief for Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 11, Kelley, 132 S. Ct. 380 (2011) (No. 11-101).
141. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 305.
142. Brief for Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 4, Kelley, 132 S. Ct. 380 (2011) (No. 11-101).
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unnecessary confusion to this already inconsistent opinion.
Not only do these new rules leave artists, specifically those
working with organic materials, in the dark as to the scope of
potential copyright protection for their works, but they also
challenge and harm the ability of legal advocates to advise
and educate these artists in the area of copyright law.143
CONCLUSION
The relationship between law and culture is an
interdependent one, characterized by cycles of definition,
slippage, and redefinition.144 Our legal regime, and the
Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause specifically, is
meant to promote progress, and the copyright system is a key
vehicle to both promoting and dictating this progress.145 As
such, copyright is a powerful engine for stimulating and
facilitating creative and artistic outlets, and in organizing the
private cultural production and distribution of our artistic
goods.146
In recognition of this power, and in deference to the
progressive goals of the Constitution, it is important for
courts to refrain from using copyright to dictate or restrict our
cultural progress in the name of promoting it.147 While
contemporary art may pose many questions—or even perhaps
concerns—about the artwork’s meaning or its level of artistic
taste, the courts must not twist the statutory standards for
basic copyrightability in an effort to prove a cultural point.
The question “Is it art?” is not one to be determined in a court
of law.
Such “judicial activism” in the art world is
unwarranted and arguably harmful. When the courts put
aside notions of artistic taste and judgment, a proper
copyright analysis can be applied to an artwork. The courts
must remain objective in their determination of
copyrightability in order for cultural progression in the arts to
remain uninhibited and forward-thinking.
The present fate of Mr. Kelley and his Wildflower Works
143. Id. at 11, 4.
144. Cohen, supra note 116, at 1194-95.
145. Id. at 1170, 1177.
146. Id. at 1193.
147. Xiyin Tang, That Old Thing, Copyright. . .: Reconciling the Postmodern
Paradox in the New Digital Age, 39 AIPLA Q.J. 71 (2011).
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exemplifies judicial activism wielded through the powerful
copyright system. The Seventh Circuit’s holding not only
opens up a Pandora’s Box of copyright issues for those
artworks which incorporate natural elements, but also greatly
undermines the domains of such already nontraditional art.148
We are fortunate to live in an era in which groundbreaking
artistic developments happen daily. However, it is precisely
these innovative, and at times avant-garde, creations that are
most in need of supportive legal practices and policies if they
are to survive and contribute in our increasingly commercial
and litigious society.149

148.
149.

Yap, supra, note 62.
Id.

